Michigan Law Review
Volume 119

Issue 6

2021

Natural Language Processing for Lawyers and Judges
Frank Fagan
EDHEC Business School (France)

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Science and Technology
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Frank Fagan, Natural Language Processing for Lawyers and Judges, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1399 (2021).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol119/iss6/17

https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.119.6.natural
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING
FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES
Frank Fagan*
LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT, & THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS. Edited by Michael A . Livermore and Daniel N . Rockmore.
Santa Fe: Santa Fe Institute Press. 2019. Pp. xxx, 490. Cloth, $32.99;
paper, $13.99.
INTRODUCTION
If written forty years ago, Law as Data: Computation, Text, & the Future
of Legal Analysis would have surely contained several chapters on how to
code a computer to evaluate facts and generate a legal decision. The earlier
fascinations of legal academics with computers focused heavily on replacing
lawyers and judges, and tracked much of the early enthusiasm of computer
scientists for developing a general artificial intelligence (AI) that could replicate the human mind. 1 Work on that project continues, 2 much like legal
scholars continue to develop automated forms of rulemaking and adjudication. 3 Nonetheless, there is today widespread recognition that less ambitious
* Associate Professor of Law, EDHEC Business School (France). Email:
frank.fagan@edhec.edu.
1 . See ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 18–20 (Stuart Russell & Peter
Norvig eds., 3d ed. 2010) (describing the early enthusiasm and great expectations between 1952
and 1969 for “general problem solver[s]” that were designed to implement fundamental human problem solving “protocols”). That era was followed by a dose of reality between 1966 and
1973, when computer scientists broadly recognized that the earlier generation had failed to
come to grips with the “combinatorial explosion,” especially of hypotheses, that plagues AI to
this day. Id . at 20–22. On this last point, see PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM:
HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 73
(2015).
2 . See, e .g ., Steve Lohr, A .I . Is Doing Legal Work . But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet .,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/technology/lawyersartificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/G2N3-EBS7].
3. Consider that smart contracts feature contingent or “automated” enforcement much
like covenants in loan agreements. Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 309, 323 (2017). Legislation can be contingent, too, as when one set of
rules overrides another when something probabilistic happens. See Eric A. Posner, Introduction to THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 3 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., 2017). The automated-law project has more in common with the phrase “Code is Law,” as opposed to “Law as
Data.” In the former, the underlying architecture of the legal system regulates citizens. The
tagged phrase comes from LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 1 (2006), which describes
how the hardware and software of the Internet regulate the actions that take place in cyberspace. The general idea is discernible in French postmoderns such as Michel Foucault, who
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applications of artificial intelligence can improve life and legal practice. General AI is not needed. With bigger stores of data, concrete advances in life
and law can be gained, even with “weak” AI. 4
Against this historical background, Michael Livermore 5 and Daniel
Rockmore 6 construct an important collection of chapters that, taken together, ask the reader to consider the relevance of data for law. Common lawyers,
of course, are deeply familiar with the practice of sifting through case law
and distilling legal rules, and the act of matching and distinguishing cases
can be readily understood as a form of textual classification. In some way,
law has always been data, and lawyers have always done the work of today’s
machines. This is obvious. After all, artificial intelligence mostly does the
things that humans have done for years. It is when the machine does something more, such as discover a connection between a fact and a legal outcome previously hidden from humans for centuries, that makes us stand up
and take notice. 7 Livermore and Rockmore clearly wish the reader to consider what these advances mean for law.
For lawyers and judges, and perhaps non-empirically minded legal academics, there is an uncertainty or skepticism that pervades this consideration because, among other things, data science has not (yet) transformed
legal practice broadly. Humans still try cases and render judgments. Lawyers
can be observed, relatively unaided by machines, making strategic decisions
in litigation or transactions. Judges rule on disputes or questions of law
without additional assistance than that provided by their law clerks and secretaries. 8 This is true despite significant advances in computer-assisted
describe “normalizing” or “regulatory” forces emanating from many things, including the layout of cities, the architecture of buildings, the classification of psychiatric disorders and disease, and of course, the classification of right and wrong. See, e .g ., MICHEL FOUCAULT, 2 THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE USE OF PLEASURE 12 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990)
(1985); see also Gerald Turkel, Michel Foucault: Law, Power, and Knowledge, 17 J.L. & SOC’Y
170, 185 (1990).
4. This Review uses artificial intelligence as a general term to encompass human tasks
carried out by machines. Weak AI sometimes refers to a machine with the capacity to carry out
a specific or narrow set of tasks. General AI, sometimes referred to as strong AI, refers to a machine with the capacity to carry out an open-ended set of tasks while harnessing a full range of
cognitive abilities, much like a human. See ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 1, at 22–27.
Machine learning, an important subset of AI, refers to the ability of a machine to learn on its
own with some amount of guidance from a human. Id . at 2.
5. Edward F. Howrey Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
6. William H. Neukom 1964 Distinguished Professor of Computational Science,
Dartmouth College.
7. For example, Macey and Mitts examine 9,380 veil-piercing cases and find evidence
that courts are more likely to veil-pierce when doing so furthers a federal statutory purpose.
Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for
Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 115 (2014). Previous theories focused
elsewhere. Id . at 104–10.
8. Although the use of algorithmic risk assessment in sentencing and bail decisions is
growing. See Brandon Garrett & John Monahan, Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk Assessment in
Sentencing, JUDICATURE, Summer 2019, at 42, 43; John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson,
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search for evidence (e-discovery) and legal rules (Lexis and Westlaw). 9 On
the other hand, one cannot deny machine learning’s growing influence in
law as evidenced by, among other things, increased entrepreneurial activity
and investment in automated legal technology. 10 Nonetheless, things still feel
new, and the scope of future transformation remains unclear for legal practitioners.
I.

NLP RESEARCH FOR LAW

A. Prediction vs . Causality
The chapters contained within Law as Data successfully reduce some of
that uncertainty by spending significant time on method (about one-fifth of
the book) as well as providing a number of applications (roughly four-fifths).
This structure, and the presentation of the book in general, clearly demonstrates that method drives the selection of research questions. This may seem
unremarkable, but it is perhaps the book’s most important insight to be
gained by newcomers to empirical legal studies. Popular conceptions of artificial intelligence and machine learning paint a picture that machines can do
it all. This is not true. While AlphaZero may be able to defeat any human
opponent, the algorithm is helpless if the rules of chess change frequently
enough. 11 Many legal domains are characterized by rapid change, but algorithms require sufficiently stable environments for making accurate predictions. 12 Besides, law itself is situated within social and political life, and even
general artificial intelligence may prove useless, and certainly undesirable,
for political competitors. A general and strong form of AI, for instance, may
be able to instruct lawmakers where to place a bridge so as to cause minimal
traffic, pollution, building costs, and accidents, but it is easy to imagine that

Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1729
(2018).
9 . See Livermore & Rockmore, pp. xiv–xv; Copus, Hiibert & Laqueur, p. 22.
10. For example, the Stanford Legal Tech List, hosted by CodeX at tech.law.stanford
.edu, lists 1,744 (as of March 15, 2021) companies that are “changing the way legal is done.”
About Page, CODEX TECHINDEX, https://techindex.law.stanford.edu/about [https://perma.cc
/2CWH-F28R].
11. AlphaZero is an AI program developed to play chess and other games. David Silver
et al., A General Reinforcement Learning Algorithm that Masters Chess, Shogi, and Go Through
Self-Play, 362 SCIENCE 1140–44 (2018). A major assumption underlying AI systems, however,
is that the context in which the system is operating remains relatively unchanging. See LESLIE
VALIANT, PROBABLY APPROXIMATELY CORRECT 61–62 (2013).
12. In addition, they require “big data.” See IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BENGIO &
AARON COURVILLE, DEEP LEARNING 20 (2016), which notes that “[a]s of 2016, a rough rule of
thumb is that a supervised deep learning algorithm will generally achieve acceptable performance with around 5,000 labeled examples per category and will match or exceed human performance when trained with a dataset containing at least 10 million labeled examples”
(emphasis added). It is plausible that many questions in law can only draw on small amounts
of data and cannot be answered with current tools.
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politicians will desire to build the bridge elsewhere to provide jobs and construction contracts to their favored constituents.
For the most part, Law as Data provides a narrow but important focus
on questions related to the feasibility of machine learning in law by analyzing the distinction between prediction and causality. Three chapters, placed
early within the first section of the book, provide a substantial discussion,
and the reader might benefit from approaching them together as a whole.
Algorithms predict; they are not equipped with the tools of causal reasoning. 13 Lawmakers may wonder, for example, if the introduction of universal
basic income will cause a 10 percent reduction in crime, but predictive algorithms cannot answer that question. Policy decisions, of course, can be made
on the basis of noncausal forecasts, but one must be comfortable implementing new rules without tested reasons—other than “it seems to work often”—
and trust that this prediction is sufficiently robust and stable over time.
Prediction examines the past in order to make sense of the future. The
accuracy of a predictive inference is therefore beholden to its understanding
of the past. Causal inference shares this approach. It relies on observations
made earlier in time in order to deduce a relationship that will come about
tomorrow. Of course causal inference can be used to identify relationships
that obtain in the past and present, but lawmakers are generally interested in
the future. For instance, an empirical legal scholar engaged in causal inference may produce a study that demonstrates a relationship between incarceration in maximum-security prison and reduced inmate misconduct. 14
The study may conclude that placing an inmate in a maximum-security
prison reduces the likelihood of misconduct by 10 percent. The causal claim
asserts that this relationship holds in the past, present, or future; but a policymaker evaluating plans for prison expansion is obviously interested in
whether the security level of a prison will impact inmate misconduct tomorrow. Lawmaking is a forward-looking endeavor.

13. On the other hand, researchers are actively working on supplying machine-learning
algorithms with the tools of causal inference. See generally Judea Pearl, Theoretical Impediments to Machine Learning with Seven Sparks from the Causal Revolution, ARXIV (Jan. 15,
2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZZ5-TUUZ]. The task is challenging. Simply adding a new variable can generate exponential growth in the number of candidate hypotheses of a causal relationship. See DOMINGOS, supra note 1, at 73. In principle,
more data could reduce the number of hypotheses, but adding more data typically introduces
more variables, which in turn leads to new, additional hypotheses of the causal relationship.
Thus, it is common for the number of hypotheses to exceed the number of observations. See
VALIANT, supra note 11, at 74. For further discussion and an example in bankruptcy law, see
Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Rules, Standards, and Judicial Discretion, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 23 (2019).
14 . See, e .g ., Richard A. Berk & Jan de Leeuw, An Evaluation of California’s Inmate Classification System Using a Generalized Regression Discontinuity Design, 94 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
1045, 1052 (1999). For further discussion of the Berk and de Leeuw study, as well as a helpful
discussion of regression discontinuity methods for law, see Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin,
Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17 (2011).
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For this reason, both predictive and causal inferences of legal outcomes
are susceptible to changing circumstances and the changing behavior of parties. 15 Inmates may learn of a new deadly virus and begin to practice social
distancing on their own, which may, in turn, reduce levels of misconduct independent of a prison’s security level. A causal study carried out in 2018,
even if perfectly designed to mimic an ideal random experiment, would generate incorrect inferences in 2020. Changing circumstances generate errors
no matter how perfectly a study simulates law’s random application. Indeed,
even if equal protection and other constitutional rules were ignored and a
law were applied randomly, 16 any conclusion regarding that law’s causal effect is accurate only to the extent that the future resembles the past.
Because so much of empirical legal scholarship attempts to make causal
inferences, 17 there is a real need to define what, exactly, predictive empirical
legal scholarship should (and can) be doing. In a lucid passage written by
Marion Dumas and Jens Frankenreiter, this need is clearly stated:
[O]ne important challenge for researchers seeking to exploit the full potential of machine learning techniques is to identify questions that can be answered meaningfully by means of prediction and classification. This consticonstitutes a rather new epistemological approach for social scientists, and
research agendas based on predictive inference are just starting to emerge.
(Dumas & Frankenreiter, pp. 63–64; citation omitted)

15. Causal studies often side-step the second challenge of “changing behavior of parties”
by assuming a fixed distribution of party characteristics. For instance, when evaluating whether an additional hour of study for an exam enhances performance, various attributes of the
members of a student body, such as stamina, can be considered fixed or “exogenous” to the
treatment of an additional hour of study. Of course, an additional hour of study might increase
stamina. There are generally two groups of techniques used to sidestep this problem. One
group adjusts for differences in party characteristics through observation. Popular techniques
include regression analysis, propensity scoring, and matching. See GUIDO W. IMBENS &
DONALD B. RUBIN, CAUSAL INFERENCE FOR STATISTICS, SOCIAL, AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES:
AN INTRODUCTION (2015). Another adjusts for differences through modeling, particularly
“structural modeling,” which basically identifies the characteristics (or “preferences”) of people, as well as a model of how those characteristics come about. Id .; Susan Athey, Machine
Learning and Causal Inference for Policy Evaluation, 21 KDD '15, at 5, 5 (2015), https://doi.org
/10.1145/2783258.2785466 [https://perma.cc/P3QD-GSHA]. Model parameters are then estimated from data. Both categories of techniques for identifying party characteristics, whether
through observation or modeling, are susceptible to changing circumstances that remain uncaptured. Advanced techniques that leverage machine learning for identifying characteristics
remain susceptible to changing and uncaptured circumstances as well.
16. For a discussion, see Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 967–74 (2011).
17. Empirical legal studies exhibit a wide range of approaches. Daniel E. Ho & Larry
Kramer, Introduction: The Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1197 n.3
(2013). However, studies that “prioritize research design (often approximating a natural experiment) [can] credibly estimate the causal effect of some intervention of interest.” Id . at 1200.
The “credibility revolution” in social sciences has led to an increase in causal inference studies
in law.
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So much more of this statement is to be made for law. What can the data
available to lawmakers accomplish? One way of approaching this question is
to ask in which situations predictive inference is superior to its causal counterpart. As should be clear, the accuracy of both inference types benefits
from environmental stability. Causal inference works well in medicine, for
instance, because biochemical reactions are analyzed within a relatively
closed environment (i.e., a human body), and differences across humans can
be accounted for by means of randomization. 18 Across time, fundamental
changes to the typical human body tend to occur gradually, and at a pace
slow enough for making valid causal inferences in, say, 2020 or 2025 on the
basis of tests performed throughout a prior decade. In contrast, causal inference tends to work poorly when engaged in tasks such as inferring future
stock prices because financial events must be analyzed within relatively open
environments subject to change. Markets adapt quickly, and better predictions are quickly arbitraged away. Moreover, changes to underlying market
structure in which financial events occur are common but relatively unexpected, as when central banks make dramatic and systemic interventions.
What does this mean for law? In situations where the legal environment
is comprehensively understood and stability is likely, well-designed causal
studies of policy will tend to generate fewer errors. 19 Where comprehension
is low and the policy domain undertheorized, or where the stability of the
domain is less likely, causal inference should be trusted less. Further, legal
domains that reflexively adapt to intervention (like markets) will likely be
better suited to prediction in most instances. In these settings predictive inference offers at least two advantages: (1) its conclusions are less ambitious
and can therefore be trusted more relative to an inference of the same relationship with causal methods; and (2) prediction involves far-reaching collection of seemingly unrelated variables that can soak up poorly understood
aspects of the policy environment. Generous inclusion of variables can lead
to robust inferences that can later be refined with theory and further testing.
One of the achievements of Law as Data is that it provides a guide for exploring and developing predictive inference research agendas in law.
B. Basic NLP Research for Law
Most of the remaining fourteen chapters supply the reader with applications. Within this grouping, one can loosely track the familiar distinction
found in the hard sciences between early-stage basic research and later-stage
applications for industrial use and consumption. “Basic” research chapters
include:
18. This includes differences that are unobserved. Ho & Rubin, supra note 14, at 22
(“Randomization over a large number of units ensures that treatment and control units are
comparable in all respects other than the treatment.”).
19. These studies can identify party characteristics with a number of methods, including
observational study, structural modeling, and machine learning. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Athey, supra note 15, at 5–6.
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•

a textual examination of law that maps its broad domains, features, and contours (Livermore & Rockmore, Chapter One);

•

analysis of the Supreme Court’s writing style to uncover broad
trends in substance and intelligibility (Carlson, Rockmore, Riddell, Ashley & Livermore, Chapter Five);

•

analysis of the same for the European Court of Justice (Frankenreiter, Chapter Seven);

•

a demonstration of how the text of judicial opinions can be represented by machines to enable downstream prediction tasks (Ash
& Chen, Chapter Eleven);

•

a demonstration of how measurement of cross-references within
civil codes can be used to support qualitative assertions about differences among legal systems (Badawi & Dari-Mattiacci, Chapter
Twelve);

•

detection of conservative versus liberal phrases in environmental
case law and classification of judicial ideology (Dumas, Chapter
Fourteen); and

•

an analysis of semantic intelligibility of state and federal trial
court opinions (Feldman, Chapter Fifteen).

While some of these chapters include potential administrative applications, their use for lawyers and judges is less apparent and immediate. As a
result, this grouping of chapters makes a strong case that natural language
processing (NLP) techniques clearly work well for broad research questions
that examine the workings of law from afar. Description and investigation of
the general contours of law and legal systems, the writing style of judges in
terms of substance and intelligibility, and the detection of partisanship in judicial opinions are, all, clearly of scientific value and merit sustained research. Nonetheless, there remains the important question of “What next?”
It is true that several of the chapters listed above present obvious normative questions. Should the use of cross-references within codes and other
laws be restricted or expanded, perhaps with legislation? 20 What, if anything,
should be done about judicial partisanship? 21 Should judges and their clerks
adopt simplified writing styles? 22 But it is hard to imagine concrete applications, such as Congress passing a law mandating threshold Flesch-Kincaid
scores 23 for judicial opinions, though at least one state requires a minimum
score for insurance policies. 24

20 . See Badawi & Dari-Mattiacci, chapter 12.
21 . See Dumas, chapter 14.
22 . See Feldman, chapter 15.
23. Flesch-Kincaid scores measure readability based upon word, sentence, and syllable
counts. Feldman, pp. 415–16.
24. See FLA. STAT. § 627.4145(1)(a) (2019), which notes that certain insurance policies
must “achieve[] a minimum score of 45 on the Flesch reading ease test as computed in subsec-
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Applied NLP Research for Law

The remaining chapters contained within Law as Data tilt more toward
practical and immediate applications for law practice. “Applied” research
chapters include:
•

prediction of the likelihood that state legislation will reach the
floor on the basis of characteristics of legislatures, legislators, and
importantly for drafters, the legislation text (Eidelman, Kornilova
& Argyle, Chapter Six);

•

an examination of whether particular phrases uttered by inmates
during parole hearings, nonverbal inmate characteristics, and decisionmaker biases increase the likelihood of parole (Laqueur &
Venancio, Chapter Eight);

•

the development of a natural language processing approach to analyze and summarize mass commenting on administrative agency
rules (Eidelman, Grom & Livermore, Chapter Nine);

•

an analysis of the case files for all employment law cases that were
closed within a U.S. district court over a seven-year period to determine whether various features of a lawsuit can predict its caseending event such as settlement, dismissal, and summary judgment; and a description of (1) the frequency and distribution of
case-ending events, (2) the legal doctrines used in summary
judgment, and (3) the strategic patterns used by defense lawyers
and judges (Alexander, al Jadda, Feizollabi & Tucker, Chapter
Ten);

•

an examination of whether an attorney’s vocal style of uttering
“Mr. Chief Justice” and “May it please the Court” can predict Supreme Court outcomes (Chen, Halberstam, Kumar & Yu, Chapter
Thirteen);

•

a discussion of how machine learning can be used to detect extralegal bias in judicial decisionmaking (Chen, Chapter Sixteen); and

•

early development of a machine-learning task in which an algorithm predicts which case citations will be used by judges based
solely on the words contained within their opinions (Livermore &
Rockmore, Chapter Seventeen).

These chapters demonstrate that natural language processing methods
have potential for changing legal practice.
One may wonder, however, about how extended knowledge of language
could introduce new opportunities to “game the system” that lead to social
loss. Will, for example, knowledge and use of the “magic” words that should
be uttered by inmates during parole hearings degrade the quality of parole
decisions? Should lawyers fret about voice intonation when they approach
tion (5) or an equivalent score on any other test comparable in result and approved by the office.”
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the bench? Perhaps these questions simply reflect the general problem of
separation between words and meaning as patterns of speech become habituated. 25 Surely, judges and other decisionmakers will search for new guides
as signal quality degrades. In any case, it is apparent that sustained development of these types of studies will raise important normative questions regarding the mechanization of law.
Related is Daniel Chen’s chapter on the detection of extralegal bias in
judicial decisions. 26 Chen cites research that shows that decisionmakers tend
to reduce bias when alerted. 27 Machines, equipped with a capacity to observe
many variables at once, can detect and uncover various biases unbeknownst
to the judge who perpetuates them. 28 Once notified, that judge can engage in
introspection and self-correction. 29 Like the chapters on inmate utterances
and lawyer voice patterns, Chen’s chapter raises the broader question of how
lawyers and judges should react to the hidden connections uncovered by
machines. Gaming the system often carries a negative connotation, but machines can teach us something socially worthwhile, too, especially when they
provoke self-reflection.
The remaining chapters contained within this grouping are of obvious
use to legal practitioners as well. The chapter written by Charlotte Alexander
and others develops a tool that predicts case outcomes on the basis of filings. 30 While it achieves moderate accuracy on the basis of filings from the
early stages of litigation (Alexander, al Jadda, Feizollabi & Tucker, p. 307),
further work in this area is clearly of social value inasmuch as predicting case
outcomes can lower the costs of litigating and judging. When parties can accurately estimate case outcomes, judicial caseloads tend toward plaintiff victories 50 percent of the time. 31 This means that parties will tend to only file
close cases and will either settle or choose not to litigate unlikely victories.
Setting aside the noneconomic compulsions to sue, further development of
25. Contemporary formulations of this idea can be found in FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE,
COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Perry Meisel & Haun Saussy eds., Wade Baskin trans., Columbia Univ. Press 2011) (1959). Saussure emphasized that the meaning of language is socially
constructed, which implies that the meaning of signifiers (words or voice intonation) is dependent upon human relationships. Id . at 15. Put differently, magic words may lose their magic once everyone is using them.
26 . See Chen, chapter 16.
27. He gives the example of NBA referees, who, once alerted of racial bias, proceed to
reduce it. Chen, p. 440 (citing Devin G. Pope, Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, Awareness Reduces Racial Bias (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 19765, 2013),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w19765/w19765.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39N2-4FFC]).
28 . E .g ., Chen, pp. 437–38.
29 . Cf . MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES
OF GOOD PEOPLE 1–5 (2013) (describing optical illusions, produced by automatic processes in
the mind, that easily can be reversed as soon as the illusion is brought to a viewer’s attention).
30 . See Alexander, al Jadda, Feizollabi & Tucker, chapter 10.
31. Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & Daniel Klerman, The Priest-Klein Hypotheses: Proofs and Generality, 48 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 59, 60 (2016).
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predictive litigation tools promises to reduce aggregate litigation costs and
unburden dockets. But note that predictive accuracy can become muddled
over time, much the same way that the connection between magic words and
their signal might become severed if overused. As litigants rely more on predictive tools to make litigation choices, fewer cases will be decided by judges
and precedent stocks will be reduced. 32 In addition, case features will likely
diverge rather than converge over time as environments change. All of this
points to cyclical patterns of certainty then uncertainty, which means that
predictive accuracy will sharpen, then dull, and then sharpen again as precedent will constantly need to play catch up with environmental change. 33 This
implies that there exists a socially optimal level of effort that should be directed toward building legal prediction systems.
This logic applies broadly. Michael Livermore and Daniel Rockmore’s
interesting task of predicting case citations on the basis of the words contained within a judicial opinion can be made easier by delimiting a time
frame such as “any opinion written between 2020 and 2025.” 34 Other approaches correlated with time might be fruitful, such as, “any opinion written before the introduction of the self-driving car,” or “all asylum decisions
prior to the XYZ civil war,” even if these approaches sacrifice the generality
inherent in Livermore and Rockmore’s task. An artificial intelligence that
can handle completely new environments cannot rely on the tools of predictive inference because it has no data from which to build conclusions. To accurately predict outcomes, the AI would need to be equipped with the tools
of causal inference, which are currently unavailable to machines as Chapters
Two, Three, and Four make clear. Even then, its domain must be adequately
understood and remain sufficiently stable as emphasized above. 35
II.

DOCTRINAL NLP STUDIES WITHOUT PREDICTION

Law as Data is interdisciplinary. The authors of its chapters include lawyers, computer scientists, political scientists, policy studies scholars, and
economists. They are brought together by a shared interest in applying
methods for evaluating textual data to answer questions about law and legal
institutions broadly considered. Because so much of legal practice is expressed textually—and takes the form of written pleadings, opinions, statutes, and regulations (let alone the written workings of administrative
processes and legislative routines)—it would seem that natural language pro-

32. This is true given a uniform or normal distribution of likelihoods of plaintiff victory.
33 . See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 250–51 (1976) (noting that the value of precedent depreciates due to obsolescence). Accident law developed for collisions of automobiles, for instance, will likely provide guidance, but not hard rules, for collision of self-driving
automobiles.
34 . See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (noting how predictive accuracy benefits from environmental stability).
35 . See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
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cessing has a bright future in law. In addition, legal data is “highdimensional”; that is, a single unit of study (an observation) consists of many
variables. For instance, a judicial opinion may consist of 4,000 words, and
each word might be counted as a variable. Natural language processing tools
are crafted specifically for analyzing numerous observations that contain
thousands of variables.
One area full of potential is the conversion of doctrinal standards into
rules. 36 For example, in their study of corporate veil piercing, Jonathan
Macey and Joshua Mitts analyze the full text of 9,380 decisions and provide
evidence that courts rarely use undercapitalization as a veil-piercing rationale. 37 If this research were internalized by courts, then undercapitalization would be one less rationale to rule on, or at least evaluate, when
determining whether to veil pierce. In addition to providing evidence that
undercapitalization is rarely dispositive, Macey and Mitts use NLP to develop a coherent and streamlined taxonomy for what is widely considered a
messy and sprawling doctrine. 38 I take the same approach in a study of 2,100
successor-liability decisions. 39 The NLP analysis uncovers evidence that
courts incoherently apply de facto merger doctrine and offers an updated
taxonomy. 40
Of course, natural language processing can reveal relative imprecision
and a lack of rules. For instance, in a study of approximately 20,000 cases related to contractual good faith, the texts uncovered consistent application of
a standard. 41 While additional fine-grained analysis of the opinion texts
might reveal highly contextual rule application, 42 revelation is possible only
to the extent that a legal domain remains sufficiently stable over time. 43

36. On the conversion of standards to rules generally, beyond doctrine, see Fagan &
Levmore, supra note 13, at 1.
37. Macey & Mitts, supra note 7, at 99.
38. They note that courts pierce for three reasons: “(1) achieving the goals of a particular regulatory or statutory scheme; (2) avoiding fraud or misrepresentation by shareholders
trying to obtain credit; and (3) promoting the bankruptcy value of eliminating favoritism
among claimants to the cash flows of a firm.” Id . at 113.
39. Frank Fagan, From Policy Confusion to Doctrinal Clarity: Successor Liability from the
Perspective of Big Data, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 391 (2015).
40. In particular, the article notes that courts incoherently use de facto merger to spread
risk in jurisdictions where successor liability is supposed to be used for suppressing bad behavior and evasion of predecessor liabilities. Id . at 394–95. NLP is used to develop a new taxonomy
of successor liability that eliminates the confusion. Id . at 394.
41. Frank Fagan, Waiving Good Faith: A Natural Language Processing Approach, 16
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 633 (2020). The majority of the opinions demonstrated that judges applied
“community standards of decency, fairness, and reasonableness” between contractual partners
when assessing good faith violations. Id .
42 . Cf . Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND.
L.J. 1401, 1401 (2017) (describing the development of microdirectives on the basis of contingent and specific factual contexts).
43 . See Fagan & Levmore, supra note 13, at 16, 19 (noting that sufficient stability of a
legal domain is a necessary condition for good machine-generated rules).
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There is, of course, a possibility that extratextual analysis could reveal hidden
rules inasmuch as judges simply pay lip service when uttering standards, but
in either scenario, NLP can help. It will either distill doctrine to closed-ended
rules, or provide further rationale for maintaining open-ended standards. 44
These examples demonstrate that NLP on its own—without relying on
machine-learning algorithms that make predictive (or even causal) inferences—can be of considerable use to lawyers and judges. Older descriptive
studies of legal doctrine that populate law reviews and treatises rely on handcoded cases and small datasets. 45 They suffer from selection bias. Oldfashioned positive studies of black-letter law carried out with sophisticated
NLP tools can clarify standards and help make law more precise. 46 The social
benefits of this work include reduced litigation costs and fewer judicial errors. 47 Law as Data describes this work as a quantitative, internal study of
law (Livermore & Rockmore, p. 10). It is certainly descriptive work of great
potential value.
CONCLUSION
Law as Data provides a comprehensive overview of what natural language processing can bring to law. Through its wide-ranging chapters, it
demonstrates that predictive inferences drawn from large stocks of data can
transform legal practice in areas as diverse as word choice and intonation,
selection of litigation strategy, legislative drafting, and judging. Several chapters, when read together, supply the reader with a good understanding of the
technical differences between predictive and causal inference and what those
differences mean for policymaking. Specialists will undoubtedly consult individual chapters, but Law as Data can be profitably read as a whole. What
emerge from its entirety are the potential outcomes of a slow, but persistent,
evolution of legal research and practice. To lawyers and judges, the possibilities will be both novel and familiar.
44. For more on how NLP can streamline doctrine, see Frank Fagan, Big Data Legal
Scholarship: Toward a Research Program and Practitioner’s Guide, 20 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 25–29
(2016).
45 . See, e .g ., Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 203 (1968). Summers’s seminal study continues to provide the basis for the Restatement approach to contractual good faith
despite relying on examples of bad-faith conduct derived from fewer than 100 cases.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 reporter’s note (AM. L. INST. 1981) (citing
Summers’s survey alongside two other authorities as the basis for a new section on good faith).
46. This is more likely when legal domains are sufficiently settled and unchanging. In
sufficiently unstable environments, law will do better with standards. See Fagan & Levmore,
supra note 13, at 33.
47. Of course other important applications, in addition to streamlining doctrine, are
being developed. For instance, researchers are actively working on the development of legalreasoning tools on the basis of predictive inference. If successful, these tools will generate legal
arguments—both for and against particular outcomes—that can then be evaluated by legal
practitioners. See KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS: NEW
TOOLS FOR LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 3–4 (2017).

